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Important reforms have been made to the oil sector tax code in Venezuela.
Given its diversity of oil resources, there was a concern that some resources
were not being exploited because of the structure of the tax code. This
paper uses traditional theoretical models to review these reforms. Then, a
panel of 821 Venezuelan oil (elds was used to estimate the eﬀects of the
reforms. The major conclusion reached is that reforms based on the de-
velopment of marginal (elds -(elds that will not produce because of the
tax structure- may overlook the distortions generated by the tax system
in non-marginal (elds, distortions that can be greater than is the case in
marginal (elds.
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Heavy Oil associated with other elements.
The latter is probably the major concern in most other countries and, therefore, in most of
the literature. See, for example, Lund [15], Kemp [10] and Kemp and Rose [12]. In these texts
the main concern is that (elds involving high developmental costs are not going to be exploited.
A summary of the history of Venezuelan oil can be gotten in España and Manzano [3] and
[4]. A good view of the diﬀerent aspects and the diﬀerent views that exists about these topics
can be gotten with three papers: Espinasa [5], Mommer [18], and Rodriguez and Sachs [22].
The oil company created in 1975, following the nationalization of the oil sector.
Actually, the project for oﬀ-shore gas was the (rst approved by Congress.
One of the singular characteristics of the Venezuelan oil sector is its diverse
resource base. Current reserves in Venezuela range from extra-heavy oil and
what is called A A , to light crudes, comparable to the WTI or Brent
crude. Consequently, the major concern in Venezuela is whether the current tax
system allows for the development of this resource base, rather than whether
each (eld is being developed to its maximum or not .
As a consequence, important changes have been made in recent years to the
tax system in Venezuela. The economics and political economy of oil production
in Venezuela is, of course, well-documented ; basically, the regulation framework
has been the same since 1944, except for changes in tax rates. Petróleos de
Venezuela (hereinafter PDVSA) pays a 1/6 royalty and income tax at a rate of
67% (the royalty is tax deductible). In 1991, Operating Agreements (A
) were introduced, and marginal (elds that, under normal circum-
stances, were not going to be exploited by PDVSA, were instead given to private
companies - companies that would produce the oil for a certain fee per barrel.
Next, in 1993, associations for heavy and extra-heavy oil production were in-
troduced ( ). One could describe these crudes in
two ways: either as low-commercial-value crudes; or as those requiring a special
Apre-re(ningAthat would make them suitable for any re(nery and, consequently,
characterize them as high-production-cost crudes. Around 60% of the reserves
discovered in Venezuela represent one or the other of these crudes; thus it was
argued that, thanks to the existing tax structure, they would not be exploited,
leading to a new regulation being approved both for their extraction and the
production of oﬀ-shore gas . In 1996, new areas were given over to private
investors for exploration and exploitation. This was termed the Aopening-upA
of the oil sector ( and I am going to refer them as exploration at
risk); however, although these areas were supposed to possess light and medium
crudes, little or no exploration was actually carried out. Once again, it was
argued that - thanks to the current tax system - there were few incentives to do
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See Karp and Livernois [9], Rowse [23] and Semmler [25].
The (rst reforms were introduced at the beginning of the 1990Ls.
See for example Kemp [10] and [11], Kemp and Rose [12] and Lund [15]. For the Venezuelan
case see Oﬃce of the Chief Economist [19] and Smith [26].
It is importatn to clarify, that in this research it will be called marginal those (elds that
were not active under the past tax structure and will produce under the new tax code.
so; once again, a new tax system was introduced in an attempt to remedy this.
This paper reviews the traditional Hotelling [7] model and introduces diﬀer-
ent taxes in order to analyze the eﬀects of changes in the tax system upon oil
exploitation. In this regard, recent literature has focused on the market power
of resource producers and how to induce eﬃciency in domestic resource mar-
kets. However, as explained before, in countries like Venezuela the government
is more concerned with the development of the oil sector and the collection of
revenue coming from the sector. Domestic markets are usually subsidized and
only represent a relatively small fraction of the total production of oil. For that
reason I will not focuss on this area.
Then, a panel of 821 Venezuelan oil (elds is used top estimate the previous
model and measure those eﬀects. There are two diﬀerent approaches to estimate
those values. The (rst approach would use data from the situation before the
taxes were introduced and data from the situation after and compare both cases.
Alternatively, knowledge of the oil sector can be used to estimate the situations
before and after a tax reform. In the Venezuelan case, the reforms are relatively
recent given the characteristics of the oil industry. Therefore the latter approach
would be used.
This approach has already been used in the past to study the eﬀects of taxes
on oil (eld development. However, in the previous literature producers are not
allowed to adjust the amount of reserves developed and/or the production path
over time in reaction to the taxes introduced. In this chapter, I will estimate
the parameters needed to calibrate a model of the oil sector for the panel of 821
(elds, and predict with that model the eﬀects of the reforms. This approach
allows for the agents to adjust to the presence and the changes of the tax code.
The primary conclusion is that tax reforms based solely upon the eﬀects of
the tax code on marginal (elds overlooks the distortions that the tax system
creates in non-marginal (elds, which can be even greater .
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents a review and extension
to our case of the theory on the eﬀects of taxes upon oil production. Then
a discussion of the singular characteristics of the Venezuelan case is done in
section 2. A model of the Venezuelan oil sector is done in section 3, followed by
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1. The Theory on Oil Production and Taxes.
Given the volatility exhibited by the price of oil, a branch of the literature has been shifting
its attention towards the use of option value techniques (See, for example, Lund [15] and Zhang
[27]. Also, Sansing [24] studies the risk sharing properties of alternative tax instruments).
Instead, I choose Hotelling for two reasons: (1) I (nd important tax distortions with the Hotelling
model and (2) the implications derived for option value models are less important in Venezuela
because the oil exploration is not characterized by large sunk-(xed costs, as in the North Sea
areas, for example.
I am using Heaps and HelliwellLs [6] formulation here.
the evaluation of the tax reforms in section 4. Finally, section 5 presents some
concluding remarks.
In this section a review and extention to our particular case of the theory on the
eﬀects of taxes on oil production is done . Subsection 1.1 reviews the Hotelling
model. Next, the eﬀects of the two main tax instruments used in Venezuela -
income tax and the royalty - upon the amount of reserves developed and the
entry conditions are analyzed, in subsections 1.2 and 1.3, respectively.
The problems of the producer of a natural resource were developed by Hotelling
[7] in its seminal work . Basically, the producer maximizes:
(1.1)
subject to
where represents pro(ts, the extraction rate, the discount rate, the
development and exploration cost and reserves.
In this paper, Iam going to assume that:
which implies that:
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will be the present value of all the expenditures in exploration and development
of the (eld.
There is an important branch of literature on the nature of . In particular, Pindyck
[21], who assumes it depends on the amount of reserves present at the time of extraction, and
also introduces the possibility of adding reserves through the lifetime of the (eld. However, one
can safely say that the simple framework used in this research will be suﬃcient to ascertain the
aﬀects of the tax system on the development of diﬀerent kind of (elds.
Models like Pyndick [21] will help us to understand the aﬀects of the tax system on the timing
of extraction and the timing of (eld development, which, though non-trivial, are not the focus
of this research.
It is important to diﬀerentiate the fact that there are oil reserves in few countries from the
fact that there are numerous oil companies exploiting those reverses. Here we are concerned
with the behavior of those (rms, which I can assume to be competitive (rms.
The complete solution to the problem is in the Appendix A.
1. There are two diﬀerent types of costs involved in producing oil: (1)
or the cost, in money, of period 0 of the reserves. This is basically made
up of exploration expenses, and may include such costs as connecting to
the distribution infrastructure, etc. . And (2) , which represents the
costs of oil extraction , and includes labor costs, gas injection, etc. .
2. This problem assumes that oil companies are price takers, an assumption
that is not so very removed from reality, at least not from the point of
view of PDVSA. .
The producer will choose the extraction path ( and ) and the amount
of reserves that maximizes the pro(t function subject to the constraint, which
implies that the total amount extracted should be equal to the reserves at the
beginning of the exploitation.
Clearly, we can solve this problem in two steps. Firstly, for the optimal
path given , and then, for the optimal . In the (rst step, we must use the
maximum principle to solve it, and the (rst order conditions would be: :
(1.2)
where - the Lagrangian multiplier - can be interpreted as the shadow price,
or user cost, of the reserves. This solution implies that the discounted marginal
pro(t of all periods should be equal, which means that production follows a
declining path - assuming that .
We then have the following Transversality Condition:
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1.2. Tax eﬀects on reserves developed
(1.3)
where represents the point where the marginal pro(t is equal to the average
pro(t or, similarly, where average pro(ts are maximized. In our particular case
(where (rms are price takers), this condition implies that is the point where
the average cost is equal to the marginal cost. Consequently, 1.2 and 1.3 imply
that production will decline until it reaches
Finally, once the optimal path is solved, we can solve for the optimal amount
of reserves, getting:
(1.4)
The problem of the government will be to try to capture . The fact that
exists and is positive is because the (elds exploited are infra-marginal. Since
the law speci(es that the owner of the (eld is the state, the government assumes
that those rents are its property. Consequently, it will introduce taxes in order
to capture .
Ideally, the (rst and best solution would be an auction for the (eld. However,
many issues arise from this:
1. Political Economy Issues: Governments cannot commit to not changing
taxes in the future - in particular, when prices are high - and, sometimes,
to not possibly nationalizing the sector.
2. There may be liquidity constraints regarding the (rms.
As a consequence, alternative instruments are used. The most common are
royalties and income taxes.
A (rst alternative with which to check whether the current tax system aﬀects,
negatively, the development of certain kinds of (elds is to check the eﬀects of
the tax system, by (eld, on the amount of reserves developed. One will do this
in this subsection.
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1.2.1. Royalty eﬀects
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The royalty is similar to a revenue tax; however, it is called a royalty because
the government is the owner of the oil (eld and thus collects its royalty from
the business.
The aﬀect of Royalties is well-documented in Heaps and Heliwell [6]. Con-
sequently, I am merely going to summarize the results already presented there
and come straight to the point I am most interested in - namely, the eﬀects of a
royalty upon the discrimination between diﬀerent (elds. Using the same model
I introduced in the previous section, if we introduce a royalty - such as that in
the Venezuelan tax code (i.e., 1/6 of the production valued at market price) -
the new maximization problem becomes:
(1.5)
subject to
where represents the royalty rate.
The solution for this problem implies that:
(1.6)
(1.7)
So, if we compare equation 1.4 with equation 1.7 it is clear that this diﬀers
from the (rst-best solution. If we rearrange 1.4 and 1.7:
, non-distortionary solution
, is the new solution.
This means that less reserves are going to be developed. The reduction will
depend on the shape of and, if development costs increase sharply, the
reduction in reserves will be less marked. This will be shown below.
Another consequence is the tilting of the production path - production is
shifted from closer periods to further ones. The reason for this is that (rms try
to minimize the net present value of the tax burden, thus postponing production
delaying tax payments. An alternative way of seeing it is that the shadow price
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of the reserves is reduced. As I mentioned before, all the previous results are
already described in Heaps and Heliwell [6]
Besides the previous results, most of the literature on the topic has thus far
focused on the tax burden . I am going to refer to this tax burden as the Net
Present Tax Rate (NPTR) , and we can check it for this case:
(1.8)
Looking at 1.8, we see a result widely reported in this area of the literature:
i.e., that the tax rate is going to be higher for those crudes with lower value ( ),
higher production costs ( ) and higher development costs ( ).
However, this analysis does not take into account the fact that producers will
adjust when they face a tax; consequently, we cannot draw conclusions regarding
just which (elds are going to be more aﬀected based solely upon the analysis
of the . For this reason, I derive the change in the amount of reserves
developed from the change in the royalty rate . From here I can calculate how
that derivative changes with respect to the parameters that we?re interested in.
I get the following results :
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(1.9)
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In particular, Heaps and Heliwell [6] develop, in detail, the change in the optimal path.
Kemp [10] and Kemp and Rose [12], for example. This is not a bad approach if you consider
that most of that literature was written to consider the tax aﬀects on oil (eld development in
places like the North Sea, where adjusting is costly. A detailed explanation of the characteristics
of oil exploitation in the North Sea can de found in Lund [15].
However, this is not the case in Venezuela, where the relatively easier conditions make it easier
for the producer to adjust.
The fact that producers do adjust to the presence of taxes is already mentioned in Livernois
[14], where the eﬀects of tax brackets on the production path are discussed.
Alternatively, Jacoby and Smith [8] also allow producers to adjust. In their case though, they
parametrize a model for the oﬀshore gas sector in the United States, and check the eﬀects of
taxes and price regulation.
The derivation can be found in Appendix A
There are some general conditions for 1.9.c and 1.9.d to be true. See Appendix A, for an
explanation.
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The results from 1.9.a and 1.9.b imply that reserves in (elds where costs
increase at the fastest rate - either in production or development - are going to
be less aﬀected by the royalty. A possible reason for this is that the royalty is
going to be an Padditional costA and is going to be proportionally less relevant in
cases where development costs or operating costs increase faster. Alternatively,
and using a common description used in Public Finance literature, inelastic
agents bear most of the burden, but then also alter less as a consequence of
the tax imposed. Consequently, if we are interested in the amount of reserves
not developed because of the tax structure, these agents are going to reduce
their reserves less than the more elastic agents do. As I mentioned before, these
results are similar to well known results from the standard literature in public
(nance concerning inelastic agents. In fact, the development costs result is
already mentioned in Heaps and Heliwell[6].
The result in 1.9.c contravenes conventional wisdom. It means that the
reduction in reserves developed in high value (elds as a consequence of the
royalty is larger than is the case with low value (elds. The reason for this
is that high value (elds are going to lose more value relative to the costs of
developing those crudes than are low value (elds. Consequently, there will be a
larger reduction in reserves.
Finally,1.9.d implies that the only channel through which the marginal cost
aﬀects the value of the derivative is through the marginal cost of . Conse-
quently, the eﬀect is small.
We can show these eﬀects with a simple example. Let us assume
and . Figure 1.1 shows us the result from 1.9.a. In
the horizontal axis we have , and in the vertical we measure and The
diﬀerence between and is that . and show us the
value of (the Lagrange multiplier) both without and with royalty, respectively.
It is clear from the graph that the distance between A and AL is greater than
the distance between B and BL. Why is that? It is because changes
faster, and the adjustment can be produced with only small movements of .
In Figure 1.2, the diﬀerence between and is that . Again, the
distance between A and AL is greater than the distance between B and BL,
showing the result from 1.9.b. Here, changes faster and, once more, small
movements - in this case of , - will produce the adjustment. Clearly, a similar
graph will show us the eﬀects of 1.9.c and 1.9.d.
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Figure 1.1: Eﬀects of Royalty: Diﬀerent Development Costs.
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Figure 1.2: Eﬀects of Royalty: Diﬀerent Extraction Costs.
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1.2.2. Income Tax eﬀect
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It is clear that if we have a tax system that allow us to deduct all expenses,
the optimal solution will not be aﬀected by that system . However, most of
the tax codes do not recognize, or allow for, the amortization of these .
Instead, they oﬀer a tax credit for them. Therefore, the oil producer faces the
following problem:
(1.10)
subject to
where represents the tax rate, and the tax credit given .
The solution for this problem implies that:
(1.11)
(1.12)
12
In this case 1.1 will be multiplied by and it will disappear once we set the (rst order
conditions.
The expression is the rearrangement of:
The reader will note that I have not included the royalty in the expression. I am trying
to separate the aﬀects of each tax instrument, and including it would change the expression
to: The tax code in Venezuela
allows for the deduction of the royalty from the income tax.
This means that, for income tax purposes, you are allowed to deduct, as an expense, of
your investment in (eld development.
The reader familiar with the literature regarding investment and tax policy will see that the
notation is slightly diﬀerent from that used in such literature. For example, in that literature
you might expect to (nd an expression like:
where represents the tax credit given for new capital added to the (rm.
I used the formulation present in equation 1.10 in order to reQect the way that it is written
according to Venezuelan law, as explained below.
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Again, if we compare equation 1.4 with equation 1.12 it is clear that we are
not in accordance with the (rst best solution. If we rearrange 1.4 and 1.12, we
get:
, is the non-distortion solution, and
, is the new solution.
This means that, as long as fewer reserves are going to be developed.
We can also repeat the traditional analysis for tax incidence, and get:
(1.13)
Note that the tax burden is higher than because development costs are not
allowed to be fully deducted.
The (elds that will pay a higher tax rate are those that have a lower value,
higher development costs and higher operating costs.
However, we have - once again - the same problem we had with royalties: this
analysis does not take into account that producers will adjust when they face a
tax. Consequently, we cannot draw conclusions regarding which (elds are going
to more aﬀected solely as a result of analysis of the . For this reason,
I am again going to derive the change to reserves with respect to the tax rate,
and then derive it with respect to the parameters we are interested in .
I get the following results:
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(1.14)
We see that the results are similar to those in the royalty case.
The main diﬀerence here is that the marginal cost has a more direct aﬀect.
This is because the royalty is based only on the price, while the pro(t tax
takes into account the cost of producing oil. Here, again, the result contravenes
conventional wisdom in the sense that (elds with lower marginal costs will reduce
their level of reserves, as a consequence of the introduction of an income tax,
more than do those with higher costs. The reason is that, in (elds with lower
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A common term used in this literature is that these taxes are PregressiveA because low value
(elds pay the higher tax rates.
This is based on the results presented in Appendix A.
It is expected that , and it is clear that
costs, the government take with respect to development costs is going to be
greater than is the case in (elds with higher costs.
If we repeat the graphic example in section 1.2.1 we can see these results.
A (gure similar to Figure 1.1 will illustrate the result on 1.14.a, and a (gure
similar to Figure 1.2 will illustrate the last three results.
Is, then, the conventional wisdom as demonstrated in equations 1.8 and 1.13
erroneous?.
Not really. Firstly, the traditional approach says that the tax burden will be
higher and this is true - inelastic actors bear the higher burden.
Secondly, in many cases, low value (elds or (elds where operational and/or
development costs increase faster can be left undeveloped. In Figure 1.3 I pro-
vided an example of this situation, using the example in section 1.2.1 but chang-
ing the function to The situation depicted in the Figure is
that of 1.9 .c and 1.14.c. It is clear that, once you introduce a royalty or a tax,
the low value (eld will not be developed. Similarly, we can construct examples
mirroring the other conditions. However, in all these cases, the fall in reserves
will be greater in the (elds with high value, low cost or more slowly increasing
development/operating costs. Consequently, it all depends on precisely what the
focus of the study is - if it is on tax rates, the view in the traditional literature
regarding which (elds are more aﬀected by the tax structure is valid ; alterna-
tively, if it is based on the degree of reserves left undeveloped, this approach is
more suited.
Finally, we would also like to consider which of both taxes have a greater
impact on reserves developed. For that purpose, we would like to (nd the value
of the diﬀerence between the change in reserves due to an increase in the tax
rate and the change in reserves due to a change in the royalty rate. Following
the standard approach in public (nance, I calculate that diﬀerence when all the
tax rates are equal to zero. The result is:
(1.15)
The expression is positive, suggesting that reserves will fall more with the
14
Figure 1.3: Eﬀects of Taxes on Marginal Fields.
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This is done by imposing the condition , and using
the implicit function theorem to (nd .
The average pro(t per barrel developed is equal to
.
introduction of a royalty. However, equation 1.15 does not take into account
that similar increases in the rates of both taxes will produce diﬀerent amounts
of revenues. For that reason I also calculate the value of the diﬀerence imposing
equal tax collection with both taxes. The result is:
(1.16)
where represents the change in tax that will raise the same revenue as a
marginal change in royalty; and .
The expression does not have a clear sign, but we can sign the expression for
certain values of the parameters. First, as long as , .
Therefore, only in rare cases when the (eld has extremely low quality or high
cost would the royalty aﬀect the reserves less than the income tax.
On the second expression on the right-hand-side of 1.16, the expression rep-
resents the subtraction of two summations. The (rst one is a simple sum of
and the other is weighted by represents a ratio of the marginal
pro(t of the barrel produced in compared to an average pro(t, but not the
average pro(t of the reserves, but rather the average pro(t of the net present
value of the reserves. As production follows a declining path, this ratio would
be increasing through time. Therefore the process will put more weight in those
periods where is higher. Nevertheless, in the (rst periods and will
not necessarily reach a value greater than one. In spite of that, the expression
in the parenthesis of the second term on the right-hand-side of 1.16 should be
expected to be negative and have a positive eﬀect on the sign. However, it is
expected that Therefore, this term will change the sign of the whole
right-hand-side only when
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1.3. Tax eﬀects on entry conditions
1.3.1. New "dimensions# added.
We can conclude then, that in general the income tax will aﬀect the amount
of reserves developed less than the royalty. The royalty will have less eﬀect
on the amount of reserves developed when it is easier for producers to shift
production between periods. In other words, there are two margins that can be
aﬀected by taxes: the production path and the development of reserve.. Income
taxation only aﬀects one of them, the amount of reserves developed. The royalty
aﬀects both. If producers can adjust easily the production path, they would be
able to adjust less on the other margin.
The next step is then, to explore the eﬀects of the tax system on the entry of oil
(rms into diﬀerent kinds of (elds. This will be carried out in this subsection.
One of the problems faced when carrying out this analysis is the need to
assume certain functional forms in order to complete it properly. Consequently,
I am going to rely more on graphs - and the changes in relative positions in those
graphs - in this section, rather than focus on absolute magnitudes in projects
left undeveloped.
This subsection is divided as follows: Subsection 1.3.1 will explain the alter-
ations made to our original model in Section 1.1 , and then subsections 1.3.2
and 1.3.3 will explain the eﬀects of the royalties and income tax.
The (rst step is to divide the space into dimensions representing the diﬀerences
between the projects that we are interested in. I chose three properties relevant
to the Venezuelan situation: namely, the quality of crude, the degree of diﬃculty
in extracting, and the degree in diﬃculty in (nding the crude in the area.
As a consequence, our problem in 1.1 becomes:
(1.17)
subject to
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The eﬀects of taxation on quality selection in the production of natural resources is discussed
in Krautkraemer [13]. however, he focused on minerals where he consequences are diﬀerent for
geological reasons.
I switched to PeasinessA as this approach is more suitable for graphic illustration, as seen
later in this section.
A practical interpretation for can be the size of the (eld. It is well known that (elds can
be of diﬀerent sizes - it is easier to (nd marginal reserves in big (elds than it is in smaller (elds.
where the new variable will represent the oil quality , and and will
represent the ease of extracting oil and the ease of (nding it respectively .
For this purpose we assume that:
(1.18)
for
implying that higher the , better the quality and, therefore, higher the price.
On the other hand, higher results in more easy oil extraction, and therefore
lower the cost.
We also assume that:
(1.19)
for
implying that higher , results in more easy oil (nding, and therefore cheaper
development cost.
This representation in equation 1.19 divides the cost of developing reserves
into (xed cost ( ) and variable cost ( ), which is not so far from real-
ity. There are some development costs that can be considered (xed - that do
not depend on the amount of reserves developed - such as seismic exploration,
maintenance of the exploration infrastructure, etc. And there are others that
are going to depend on the degree of reserves developed -such as the number of
exploratory wells drilled. Equivalently, it can be said that there exists a pro-
duction function for reserves with (xed and variable costs, where represents
the level of increases in the amount of reserves developed per unit of PinputA
(wells) used .
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The objective is then, to (nd the combinations of and that produce
zero pro(t, assuming that there are (xed costs of development. In other words,
we substitute 1.18 and 1.19 in 1.17 and want to (nd the combinations of
and that makes the next equality hold:
(1.20)
for , and being the values that solve 1.17.
This gives us a plane on the space of and that will divide it between
pro(table and not pro(table (elds. For the sake of simplicity, I will focus only
on and .
This is illustrated in Figure 1.4. In this (gure, the Y axis measures the
easiness (nding oil space,and the X axis measures the quality. As shown in
equation 1.20 there is a negative relationship between and : if we lower oil
quality, we need to increase the easiness (nding oil to maintain zero pro(ts.
This is shown by the thick line, which represents the level curve for 1.20. In the
(gure, the projects to the right of, and above, the curve will operate. They have
either higher quality or easier to (nd reserves than do projects that make zero
pro(ts and will thus produce positive pro(ts. On the other hand, projects to
the left of, or below, the curve will not produce. They have either lower quality
or harder to (nd reserves than do projects that make zero pro(ts, and would
thus make negative pro(ts if they were to operate. By the envelope condition,
we can calculate the slope of the curve:
(1.21)
since
With this framework we introduce taxes and check to see how the Zero-
Pro(t-Condition (hereinafter, ZPC) shifts. The ideal tax will avoid these shifts.
This can be done with a PpureA pro(ts tax and any other tax will shift the
curve.
An alternative is a tax. It will change 1.20 to:
(1.22)
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Figure 1.4: Zero Pro(t Condition for Field Development
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The amount of the tax chosen is equal to the amount of economic pro(t generated by a (eld
of and This means that:
for being the solution for 1.17 with a pro(t function like 1.18 with and
Figure 1.5: Zero Pro(t Condition: Introducing a lump-sum tax
We see that this tax shifts the curve upwards, but without changing the
slope of it, represented in 1.21. In Figure 1.5, I show the zero-pro(t conditions
with and without a lump-sum tax . This implies that (elds of lower quality
and where oil is harder to (nd will be left out. However, there will be no bias
against any of them in the process because the slope of both curves is the same.
Similar conclusions can be reached by repeating the analysis for the other
two combinations of (elds characteristics de(ned here.
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1.3.2. Royalty eﬀects
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Without going trough all the mathematical procedure, the key parameters that does not
allow me to conclude that for all cases are and . The suﬃcient conditions
needed are and . We now that the latter is true in most but not all cases.
The functional form and parameters are going to be those of Medina [16]. This is the most
recent estimation of costs functions for the Venezuelan oil sector, based on an speci(cation
developed by Deacon [2].
The reader will note that both lines cross at and . The royalty rate was chosen
so as to give, at that point, the same amount of taxes as the tax.
Basically, 1.18 changes to:
(1.23)
where is again the royalty rate.
It is clear that not only the ZPC shifts, but also that the slope changes to:
(1.24)
We see that if and , then However, as seen in section
1.2, this is not true. Therefore, the eﬀect of the royalty on the slope of the curve
depends on the functional forms of the cost functions . To illustrate the eﬀects
of the royalty in concrete applications, I am going to assume functional forms .
The new ZPC is shown in Figure 1.6. Given that the royalty will shift the
ZPC, I show two solutions, the tax (which is Pslope-neutralA) and the
other with the royalty .
The ZPC seems to rotate counterclockwise. Consequently, compared to a
lump-sum tax, a royalty leaves out (elds of high quality but where oil is harder
to (nd, and allows the operation of (elds of low value but where oil is easier to
(nd. The reason is that this is a tax that does not take into account the costs
of producing the oil, favoring (elds that are low cost and easier to (nd.
This result has important welfare implications. The total surplus , rep-
resents a producerLs surplus, and therefore welfare surplus. The original ZPC
represents an Piso-surplusA line, in other words combinations of and that
has the same amount of welfare. Any point above it has a higher welfare. The
line that represents the lump-sum tax is also another iso-surplus. In the ZPC
22
Figure 1.6: Zero Pro(t Condition, Eﬀect of the Royalty
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1.3.3. Income tax eﬀect
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Again, the key parameters that does not allow me to conclude that for all cases
are and . The suﬃcient conditions needed are and . Here the
latter is always true.
As in the previous section, both lines cross at and . The income tax rate was
chosen so as to give, at that point, the same amount of taxes as the tax.
without tax the welfare level was zero, in the ZPC for the lump-sum tax the
welfare level is the amount of the tax. The fact that ZPC with royalty crosses
the ZPC for the lump-sum tax will imply that the tax system is shifting the
composition of producing (elds towards (elds were less welfare is generated. In
other words the (elds that with the introduction of a royalty (substituting a
lump-sum tax) produce will generate less welfare than the (elds that close.
Repeating this analysis on the plane de(ned by and yields similar
conclusions. The royalty shifts the ZPC, rotating. The rotation favors (elds of
lower value against (elds that are harder to extract. On the other hand, the
royalty has no eﬀects on the plane de(ned by and .
In this case, 1.17 becomes:
(1.25)
where again is the tax rate and is the investment tax credit.
Similarly to the case in the previous sections, this tax will not only shift the
ZPC but also change its slope to:
(1.26)
As before, the eﬀect of the tax will depend on the functional forms of the
cost functions .
Similar to Figure 1.6, I show in Figure 1.7 the Zero-Pro(ts-Conditions . As
with the royalty, the income tax discriminates against (elds where oil is harder
to (nd. On the plane, the income tax will not have an eﬀect. Finally on
the plane, the slope will change to:
24
Figure 1.7: Zero Pro(t condition, Eﬀect of the Income Tax
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2.1. Venezuelas Oil Tax Regime
2.1.1. Common Rules
(1.27)
Intuitively, this shift is usually biased towards (elds that are harder to ex-
tracts. This is due to the fact that extraction expenses are fully deductible from
the income tax. It is clear from 1.27 that if (i.e. fully deductibility of
investment on (eld development) the (rst fraction will disappears leaving the
expression as the slope without taxes.
The previous section developed the basic framework on oil exploitation and
taxation. In this section the particulars of the Venezuelan tax system and its
eﬀects are described and discussed. Subsection 2.1 introduces the departures of
the Venezuelan tax code from the theoretical analysis of the previous section
and the changes introduced to the original tax system. Subsection 2.2 uses
the framework developed in the section 1 to discuss the expected eﬀects of the
Venezuelan reforms upon oil exploitation.
In this part of the paper I am going to analyze the particulars of oil exploitation
in Venezuela. Firstly, I am going to describe the common rules that the tax
system possesses and the ways in which it departs from the theoretical model in
section 1. Next, I will describe the particular rules pertaining to diﬀerent kinds
of oil activity.
In this sub-section, I will analyze the eﬀects of the common rules - in particular,
those referring to development costs.
1. First, there is a tax credit on the investment in (eld development. This
credit works in the following way: each year, (rms are allowed to deduct
12% of their investment as an expense for income tax purpose. This is
equivalent to the of section 1.2.1; consequently, no further analysis is
needed.
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2. Secondly, there is another allowance for development costs. In the case of
Venezuela, they are recognized in a particular way as, each year, you are
allowed to deduct a portion of them from your taxes - a portion equal to
the proportion of the reserves of the (eld used that year. It is important to
mention that this deduction is called according to
the tax code, but that, as I will show, it will have eﬀects upon oil produc-
tion, even if the project exhibits no depreciation at all . Consequently, I
prefer to call it the and thus avoid introducing
depreciation considerations that will simply complicate things.
For the reasons mentioned above, let us
assume that there is no depreciation. The problem will then change to:
(2.1)
Clearly, this is a much harder problem to solve; however, two clear distortions
are apparent. First of all, the lack of consideration regarding the value of money
in time will make the . Consequently, this kind of deduction is
not equivalent to expensing. Secondly, you are being allowed to deduct in each
27
Formally, this provision in the law allows not only for expenses in but also for the
investments made to produce oil.
It is easy to see that the investment carried out in is diﬀerent to investment in the
production infrastructure.
Once you have discovered the reserves, you enter in the producing phase of the project. And
given the property of the (eld in Venezuela, the expenses incurred in exploration cannot be
recovered by means of selling the (eld after the (rm discovers the reserves. These expenses do
not have any depreciation or cost attached to them throughout the exploitation of the (eld.
On the other hand, investment in production will exhibit the standard depreciation costs.
Clearly, in the latter case, the way depreciation is being allowed to be deducted will have
important consequences regarding the allocation of capital in the production of oil.
Since the focus of this research is the amount of reserves developed, I can assume that there
is no depreciation in the capital invested in oil production.
The term in the square brackets is a re-arrangement of the expression representing the net
income of the (rm: .
The correct expression would actually be:
, for because development costs are incurred in diﬀerent periods and you are not
allowed to capitalize them.
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See Appendix A for a solution of the problem.
Remember that , and that . With respect to the second term,
increasing marginal costs of reserves implies that
period not the true value of the barrel of reserve being used in that period, but
the average value. This also creates a distortion, depending upon the shape of
the development costs.
Getting the standard (rst order conditions for and we arrive at :
(2.2)
(2.3)
therefore, for increasing marginal costs of reserves, is multiplied by a term that
is less than one . This kind of allowance is thus not equivalent to expensing. In
other words, if the term that multiplies were equal to one, the tax measure will
be equivalent to expensing and, consequently, the income tax will not distort the
amount of reserves being developed. However, since it is actually less than one,
distortions will arise. In principle, we could say that these distortions will be
similar to those presented in section 1.2.1; nevertheless, in this new problem the
shape of will also matter for the value of the term multiplying . Putting
2.2 and 2.3 together, we get:
To understand the eﬀects of this kind of taxation let us separate them. As-
suming, for a moment, that we see that As a consequence, less
reserves are going to be developed than would be the case without income tax.
is like a ApositiveA royalty, that will have the aﬀect of speeding the extrac-
tion process. It should be expected that, since it is like a ApositiveA royalty, it
can oﬀ-set some of the negative eﬀects of the AincompleteA expensing, but easy
algebraic manipulation demonstrates that it will not be enough.
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>Additional Rules:
2.1.2. Particular Rules
PDVSA Traditional Areas:
Heavy Oil Associations:
Finally, one should mention a couple of distortions that,
though not mentioned before, are nonetheless important. The reason for not
mentioning them in the theoretical framework is that the way they are written
in Venezuelan law does not allow us to analyze them in the simple Hotelling
model.
1. The deduction of 12% of investment in (eld development cannot be greater
than 2% of the before tax net income of the year in which the investment
is made. When (rms hit this last limit - i.e., 12% of investment 2% of the
before tax net income - they are allowed to carry forward the remaining
portion of the 12% of investment for up to three years. This method of
deduction can only be used by operating (rms (since the carry forward is
limited); consequently, it generates a new form of discrimination between
newer and older (rms. Also, if we allow for (eld development after the (eld
is in operation (as Pyndick [21] does), it will further distort the timing of
the development. However, this is a diﬀerent model, and one we will not
consider here.
2. The same can be said about losses. The analysis in section 1.2.1 was
carried out under the assumption that the rules apply everywhere, even if
the (rm makes losses. However, the tax system does not allow for losses.
Rather, you can carry them forward for up to three years for deduction
against taxable income in future periods.
This will be important for two reasons: (1) Firms tend to have losses in
the (rst years, and not all of them would be deducted; and (2) If Venezuela
continues to experience the high inQation of recent years then, even if (rms
can deduct losses in the future, the deductions will represent less than the
real value of the losses.
As I mentioned in the introduction, PDVSA
pays 1/6 royalty and 66.7% income tax.
The changes in the tax code pertaining to these
kinds of projects were that the tax rate was set at 34%, and the royalty was
29
tct = 1
46
46


 

( ) 0
0
0 0
0
  
  
   
[∫  ]
∫
∫ ∫  
[∫  ]
Operating Agreements:
( )
max = (1 ) ( ( ) ( ))
max = (1 ) ( ((1 )) ( ) )
( ) = ( ) +
max = (1 ) [ (1 ) ( )]
f q q
V  f q q c q e dt C R

V  pq  f q q e dt

f q q e dt c q e dt C R
V  pq  c q e dt C R
t t
f q
c
T
t t o t
rt
c
R,q,T
PDV SA
T
t t t
rt
PDV SA
T
t t
rt
T
o t
rt
R,q,T
PDV SA
T
rt
In this AperfectA contract, you will get an eﬀective . However, given the departures,
described below, in the actual law, it is less clear that this will be the case.
changed into a variable royalty ranging from 1-16.67%, depending on the prof-
itability of the project. As mentioned earlier, the reason for the changes to the
tax rules for these projects was that these were low value (elds.
Here, as said in the introduction, a (rm operates
a "mature" (eld on behalf of PDVSA and receives a fee per barrel. In this
case, the company producing for PDVSA pays the tax rate that applies to all
non-oil companies (30%). PDVSA pays its standard tax rate and the royalty
for production of the (eld; however, the way these agreements are designed
completely changes the problem in 1.4. Since the rules within these agreements
are extremely complicated, and since this will not allow us to introduce them
into our simple model, I am going to state the optimal designs for such contracts
and then explain the diﬀerences in Venezuela.
Ideally, what one does is to make contractors bid for a schedule of fees
for the operation of the (eld. Consequently, the problem for them would be:
(2.4)
where is the tax rate for the contractors (35% in Venezuela).
For PDVSA, the problem would be:
(2.5)
where is the tax rate for PDVSA.
Competitive bidding would imply that:
(2.6)
Which means that the problem for PDVSA would change to:
(2.7)
Consequently, we can see that the problem is similar to that in equation 1.5,
and that the income tax distortion is removed .
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PEG are the Spanish initials of Government Take on Pro(ts.
The situation in Venezuela is diﬀerent to that presented here. The schedule
is preset before the bidding, and what the agents bid is a bond payable
at the beginning of operations. Clearly, if the preset schedule diﬀers from
that which the contractors would themselves have chosen, distortions will arise.
The actual system is a very complicated formula that changes the amount of
permitted to be deducted depending on the pro(tability of the project. In
addition, it does so in brackets. Thus we cannot analyze it in this simple model.
Nevertheless, we can safely say that the system would imply that PDVSA will
maximize a function diﬀerent to 2.7 if the distortion of the tax rate wasn?t
completely eliminated.
Here, as described before, a (rm carries out the com-
plete operation - right from the initial exploration of the (eld - but these areas
are supposed to be areas of high quality crude. The tax system pertaining to
these areas is more complex: (1) there is a variable royalty; (2) the tax rate is
still 67%; and (3) an auction was called in which companies bidded upon the
Government participation rate in the post-tax "economic" pro(ts - i.e., includ-
ing developmental costs. This was called the PEG rate . However, the PEG
was set to a maximum of 50%. Therefore, if two or more companies bid 50%, a
second auction was made but (rms bidded upon an up-front payment. In such
a case, the winning (rm would pay the 50% PEG and the up-front payment.
The changes that such a regime introduces to the problem in 1.1 are:
if winning PEG 50%
if winningPEG =50%
(2.8)
Clearly, none of the new (scal parameters would aﬀect the decision made
regarding the amount of reserves developed; however, the size of the PEG rates
actually oﬀered, and the amount collected in up-front payments, clearly reQects
the fact that the previous tax system, besides the distortions described here,
failed to capture the rent it was supposed to capture.
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2.2. Expected eﬀects of the Tax Rules
2.2.1. Heavy Oils
See Oﬃce of the Chief Economist of Petróleos de Venezuela [20] for a detailed description
of the tax treatments.
See Oﬃce of the Chief Economist of Petróleos de Venezuela [20] for a detailed description
of the diﬀerences between areas.
As in the Operation Agreements, the actual setting is diﬀerent, because the
amount of that are allowed to be deducted changes with the pro(tability
of the project, and it does so in brackets. Consequently, there is going to be a
departure from the solution to the problem in 2.8.
Another important factor is that it exhibits variable royalty levels, too. The
reason for this is simple: in these (elds we can see that ,
where stands for (xed costs of exploration, which are going to be independent
of the amount of reserves found. It is clear from equation 2.8 that, the higher
the royalty, the lower the threshold of that would be necessary to make the
project viable. The reason the royalty was chosen in preference to the tax rate is
related to risks and properties that are beyond the scope of analysis our model
allows. It is clear, however, that the reduction of the royalty will have the
eﬀects presented in section 1.2.1.
We summarize the tax system in place in Venezuela and its recent changes in
Table 2.1.
As mentioned earlier, the changes to the tax code were introduced because
the (elds were diﬀerent to PDVSALs (elds. In Table I summarize those diﬀer-
nces .
In this section, then, I am going to used the framework developed in Sections
1.2 and 1.3 in order to provide a brief discussion on the consequences of these
changes, using the PDVSALs tax rules as the base case.
In these areas there was a reduction in the diﬀerent tax rates. In terms of the
amount of reserves left undeveloped, neither of the results from Section 1.2.1
or Section 1.2.1 supports the reform. Clearly, the amount of reserves lost in
PDVSA s projects because of the tax structure is more than is the case in these
(elds.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Tax Changes
Tax system
Area
Old Changes Introduced
PDVSA
Heavy
Oils
Operating
Agreements
Exploration
at Risk
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No Change
: Government participation in after-tax pro(ts.
after tax pro(ts
PEG bided.
: Up-front bond payment bided as explained in the text.
Income Tax = 66.7%
Income Tax = 35%
Royalty = 1/6 Royalty = 1%-1/6
Investment Credit = 12% Investment Credit = 100%
Depreciation = q C(R¯)/R¯
Royalty = 1%-1/6
PAfter-TaxA Tax by bidding::
if
if
Table 2.2: Summary of Field Characteristics
Area Characteristics
PDVSA
Heavy
Oils
Operating
Agreements
Exploration
at Risk
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Average Quality
Average Extraction Costs
Average Development Costs
Lower Quality
Average Extraction Costs
Average Development Costs
Average Quality
Higher Extraction Costs
Higher Development Costs
Average or Higher Quality
Average Extraction Costs
Average Marginal Dev. Costs
Higher Fixed Dev. Costs
′′
′
50
51
50
51
( )
( ) 0
( ) 0
( )
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2.2.2. Operating Agreements
PDVSA [20]. There were other motivations that I have omitted, clearly included in order to
assist with the political selling of the new tax. For example: AFields should be in economically
depressed areas of the countryA.
Because most of the reserves have been depleted.
Alternatively, it might be that the concern here was more related to the
problem in Figure 1.3 - that these (elds may not be developed at all because of
the tax structure. However, the results from Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 are against
the argument that these taxes aﬀect low value (elds more negatively than does
a neutral tax.
It remains unclear just why these (elds were selected for these forms of taxation.
In the PStatement of ProposalA - which is necessary for any change of law in
Venezuela - it states that the (elds selected for this regime were:
P1. Not priority (elds for PDVSA s subsidiaries because of its prof-
itability and the capital availability for the subsidiary.
2. Inactive or almost depleted.
[...]
6. Possessing minimum infrastructure for production, and requiring
minimum investment to operate them...A
If we can infer from these motives that these were (elds with a low ,
it becomes clear that more reserves were being left undeveloped in these areas
than were in PDVSA s areas.
Nevertheless, if , it is less clear that the tax system generates more
distortions in these (elds than it does in PDVSA s areas, in terms of reserves
developed. With , we can no longer expect that these (elds have
a low , since these are areas that have already developed some reserves.
Moreover, if these (elds also have higher operational costs and those costs in-
crease faster, as the statement on pro(tability seems to suggest, there are even
fewer arguments for this tax change.
If one of the arguments for putting these areas into a better tax system is that
oil is harder to (nd there , it becomes clear that the conclusion in Section 1.3.3
may support it in terms of entry considerations. There, it is shown that in some
cases the income tax discriminates against those areas with harder to (nd oil.
However, this will depend on the value of the cost function and, consequently,
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2.2.3. Exploration at Risk
I say this because, as I explained in Section 2.1, the design actually departed from the
neutral design.
a careful estimation of this function is needed before one can conclude that a
tax reform is needed. In addition, calculations based on the assumption that
producers do not adjust may overestimate the eﬀects of the tax rate.
Finally, some of these agreements exhibit a lower royalty, justi(ed by the
fact that these contractors may (nd diﬀerent kinds of Asub-(eldsA with diﬀerent
qualities of oil. Nevertheless, the discussion carried out regarding the Heavy Oil
Areas dismisses that argument and, therefore, the tax change.
The introduction of a new Aafter-taxA tax and the up-front bond payment are
supposed to have no eﬀects on the (rst order conditions of the producerLs prob-
lem . Consequently, no further consideration is needed.
These changes will move - upwards - the level curve for the zero pro(t condi-
tion. Nonetheless, it was supposed that these (elds were so pro(table that they
would still exist on the right hand side of the curve after the shift. Given that
only one (eld was not awarded, it would seem that, generally, this assumption
was accurate.
The important change to consider here is the reduction in the royalty. In
particular, it is not clear if the bigger exploration eﬀort needed in these areas is
going to be in the form of a (xed cost or whether these are just areas in which
oil is harder to (nd.
If the latter is the case, the change in the law addressed a clear distortion
created by the tax system. The royalty rate discriminates against areas in which
oil is harder to (nd, as explained in Section 1.3.2, and the reduction of the rate
for these areas reduces the extent of that discrimination.
If the former is the case, though, the reforms will bias the entry of projects
in these areas toward projects that are harder to (nd compared to the entry
of projects in the traditional areas. In this case, projects have an PextraA
payment. In terms of the analysis in 1.3, this means that the level curve
for the zero pro(t condition, tax, for this project is going to be higher. If
the governmentLs objective is to leave this (eld in the same tax situation
as the other areas, a reduction in the royalty will not achieve this. The result
of the shift of the after tax ZPC curve will be a bias toward areas in which oil
is harder to (nd - because these are the areas in which the royalty creates the
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3. Estimating and Calibrating a Model of the Venezuelan
Oil Sector
largest distortions.
In the previous sections I used the conceptual framework developed by Hotelling
[7] to analyze the impact of the tax code on the oil sector. Under that framework,
I introduced the taxes present in the Venezuelan tax code and its recent reform.
It allowed me to predict where, theoretically, the tax code generates the most
distortions and whether the reforms were targeting those areas. However, it did
not allow me to measure those distortions or the eﬀects of the reform.
In this section I will estimate a model for the Venezuelan oil sector that I
will use in the next section to evaluate the reforms. I will use the model of the
producer of a natural resource developed by Hotelling [7] described in equation
1.1 and summarized below. Basically, the producer maximizes:
(3.1)
subject to
being
for
and
for
where represents the oil price, the extraction rate, and the discount rate.
In this formulation I am assuming that there are two costs involved in oil pro-
duction: represents the costs of oil extraction, the development and
exploration cost associated with reserves.
, and will represent dimensions among which the oil (elds diﬀeren-
tiate. is the oil quality, and and are the ease of extracting oil and the
ease of (nding it respectively. The higher the , the better the quality and,
therefore, the higher the price. On the other hand, the higher the , the easier
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3.1. The Data Set
For con(dentiality reasons I cannot disclose the source of my data.
(L000,000 Barrels) 14001 1.9493 4.8391 0.0037 0.6332 132.6045
(L000,000 US$ 1999) 14001 8.5072 15.6457 0.0044 3.2951 237.6725
(L000,000 Barrels) 821 33.2433 73.6320 0.2447 12.3126 966.6277
821 28.3079 9.1515 8.5000 30.4000 54.2000
to extract oil and, therefore, the lower the extraction cost, and the higher the
, the easier to (nd and, therefore, the cheaper to develop.
The producer chooses the extraction path ( and ) and the amount of
reserves that maximizes the pro(t function subject to the constraint, which
implies that the total amount extracted should be equal to the reserves at the
beginning of the exploitation.
My task will be to estimate the cost functions, given the information on the
path of production and costs.
For the estimation I am using a panel of 821 (elds provided by the Explo-
ration and Production Division from PDVSA. This panel contains the expected
production for the next 20 years and their operational costs. These data are
supposedly constructed by assuming that these are optimal production paths,
given a constant price and no taxes. This information is given to a planning de-
partment, which then adds overhead expenses and makes a decision on whether
to open the (elds or not. The drawback to this panel is that the only informa-
tion it provides on reserves is the reserves at the beginning of the period. In
this regard the panel represents 33% of the total proven reserves in Venezuela.
Table 3.1 shows some of the summary statistics for the panel. The correla-
tion between production and costs is 0.7368 and the correlation between degrees
API and total production is -0.0524. The reader will notice that the number
of observations is less than 20 per (eld. Not all (elds produce for the entire 20
years in the panel. The average length of production time per (eld is 17 years.
Finally, Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of production and extraction costs.
Table 3.1: Data Set Characteristics: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
Production
Costs
Total Prod.
Degrees API
38
Figure 3.1: Production and Extraction Costs
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The information used by Medina is of public domain. However, when I do the same esti-
mation, the results are the same.
With these (elds, I can construct parameters for an extraction cost function.
However, to carry out a calibration of the model developed in the previous
section, I also need a development cost function. For that purpose I am going
to include an estimation done by Medina [17] and [16].
Since I am using the estimation by Medina, I will
(rst explain his estimation this subsection. He used aggregate data to estimate
the optimal time path of oil production in Venezuela, and then check the eﬀects
of diﬀerent taxes on that path. He estimates the following functions:
(3.2)
and
(3.3)
where represents the total amount of reserves discovered at time t, repre-
sents the total number of wells drilled time and represents the total
amount of wells drilled time (i.e. ).
Basically, equation 3.2 is a negative growth function, in which we have
barrels of oil on the ground at the beginning of the exploitation, and the marginal
well at gets the of the reserves that are left in the ground at . Then,
equation 3.3 represents the cost function of the wells drilled, which is a quadratic
cost function of the amount of wells drilled at time . Figure 3.2 shows what
equation 3.2 would look like and the shape of the development costs function as
a consequence of 3.2 and 3.3. These functions are based on a model developed
previously by Pindyck [21] and parametrized by Deacon [2].
Using the totals from the Venezuelan oil sector since 1960, the results of
MedinaLs estimation were (t-statistics in parentheses):
(3.4)
and
40
Figure 3.2: Development Cost, Functional Form Chosen
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All monetary values are in US$, 1999.
3.2. Estimating the Extraction Costs
10 845.13 + 1.4854 w + 0.7574 w D + 0.0039 w
(4.8746) (4.0514) (2.6268) (1.3100)
(3.5)
for , after 1983.
In equation 3.4, the results imply that Medina chose not to estimate , but,
rather, to use the estimates provided by the geology department of PDVSA
and estimate from there. In equation 3.5 the results imply, (rstly, that the
quadratic term is not signi(cant and, secondly, that there is a time break in the
cost function. The reason for this time break is that, originally, Deacon [2] uses
the total amount of feet drilled. However, as this information was not avail-
able for a long period of time for Venezuela, Medina uses the number of wells.
Nevertheless, it is known that the average depth of the wells drilled increased
signi(cantly after 1983, when a major exploration campaign commenced. As a
consequence, Medina introduces the change of the slope in the estimation of 3.5.
I used MedinaLs parameters scaled to the fact that his model is designed for
the aggregate and mine for individual areas. For the scaling, I used the fact that
these areas represent 39 billion barrels out of a total of 119 billion barrels of
reserves that Venezuela possesses. I assumed that the (elds were of equal size.
This then implies that, if 821 (elds represent 39 billion barrels, there will be a
total of 2505 (elds. Consequently, if we divide the total resource base by 2505,
each (eld will have a resource base of 168 million barrels.
In addition, for the scaling of , I assumed that the marginal cost of the
(rst barrel of oil in the aggregate is equal to the marginal cost of the (rst barrel
of oil in each area. Finally, the (xed cost of 3.5 was divided by the number of
(elds, and a net present value of it for 40 years (the average life of a (eld) was
used as a (xed cost for the purposes of our estimation.
Table 3.2 summarizes the parameters used. The main drawback is that I am
not able to estimate the (eldLs diﬀerences for the extraction cost ( ).
For the cost function in 3.1, I use the following speci(cation:
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3.2.1. Identi1cation Strategy
The OLS result for c is -0.01363.
 = 167 6578 10
= 0 0210
= 5 57 10
= 2 2551 10
= 0
( ) = + +
Table 3.2: Parameters Used from Medina [17]
Reserves
Costs
(3.6)
This speci(cation has the advantage that is simple but at the same time has
the convexity properties needed for the Hotelling model. I still need to describe
where I am going to introduce the diﬀerence in costs ( ) among (elds. This
will be solved with the estimation.
There is a problem, however, with carrying out a simple least square regres-
sion. In oil production, not only are costs a function of quantity but quantity
is a function of costs. Returning to Figure 3.1, it is clear from the graph that
(elds with lower costs will also be the (elds in which production is higher. This
is partly the result of a maximizing process, and generates a simultaneous equa-
tion problem. In Figure 3.1 it is clear that each (eld has a convex extraction
cost function, however if a simple Ordinary Least Square Estimation is done,
since it has to (t all points, it will return a concave function. In other words,
it will cause the estimation of in 3.6 to be negative . A solution would be to
estimate the equation 3.6 individually for each (eld. However, this will imply
that with twenty observations I will be estimating three parameters and one
variance, and in some (elds we may have fewer observations.
To solve the problem I will use the Hotelling model in 3.1 . I will assume that
the model is true and parametrize it. Then I will use the implications drawn
from this assumption, to identify the cost function.
The (rst order conditions for the problem in 3.1 imply that:
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will be the price for the Venezuelan basket. By the time the panel was done the expected
price of the Venezuelan basket was US$ 13.96. Given that crudes usually are priced in absolute
spreads over a reference value, this will imply that I can price other crudes based on the following
formula: For the purposes of our estimation this will imply
that
(3.7)
which given the parametrization chosen implies that:
(3.8)
In this expression, besides the parameters of the cost function, is unknown.
Nevertheless, I have the total production for each (eld for the years in the
sample, and integrating 3.8:
(3.9)
Consequently, I substitute 3.9 on 3.8, that expression on 3.6, and then use
Non-Linear Least Squares to estimate the resulting expression.
Table 3.3 shows the results of the estimation. Column (1) shows the estimation
assuming no individual eﬀects. The coeﬃcients are of the expected sign and
signi(cant.
The next three columns show the results with diﬀerent individual eﬀects.
Both speci(cations in (2) and (3) in the table reject the restricted model in (1),
while the speci(cation in (4) cannot reject it. I am going to choose column (3)
for three reasons:
1. In Figure 3.1 it seems that the diﬀerence is on the slope of the cost functions
and not on the intercept.
2. Theoretically, it is also more plausible to have diﬀerent marginal costs
than diﬀerent (xed costs. Basically, (elds are produced with the same
technology. The diﬀerences are going to be caused by diﬀerences in the
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In other words, these diﬀerences try to capture what in the industry jargon is referred to as
.
(t-statistics in parentheses)
on constant on on
6.7168 5.6541 4.7590
(50.7843) (58.9174) (26.8220)
0.4034 -2.5676 16.8179
(5.5477) (-6.6856) (208.2524)
0.2534 0.1196 0.2318
(134.0390) (5.2872) (181.3357)
14001 14001 14001 14001
3.1481e+06 1.0987e+06 1.5434e+06 2.2170e+06
1.87 1.04 0.42
characteristics of the (eld that are going to aﬀect the extraction pattern.
This is associated with the marginal cost.
3. Finally, if we do a Haussman Test on the value of the coeﬃcient of ,
comparing the speci(cations in (2) and (3), the test rejects (2).
Table 3.3: Results from the Non-Linear Estimation
Dependent Variable: Extraction Costs
No Individual Individual Eﬀects
Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant
N
MSE
F-test for I.E.
Choosing the speci(cation in Column (2) implies that, for our purposes,
. With the parameters, we can check the distribution of (elds in the
space of and . For that purpose, Table 3.4 shows some statistics concerning
the distribution of , and Figure 3.3 shows us the (elds in that space.
One of the striking characteristics of the table and the (gure is the concen-
tration of points around the value of . Therefore, I checked my sample
composition. In Table 3.5 I show the total production of oil in my sample and
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Fields
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4. Evaluating the Tax Changes
Crude %Sample/Country
Light/Condensated 78.0
Medium 57.4
Heavy 38.8
Extra-Heavy 0.3
Table 3.4: Summary of the Parameters Estimated
Distribution of FieldsL Dimensions
Mean 1.0412 0.2911
Std. Dev. 0.1303 4.6415
Min. 0.7591 -11.2014
10th Percent. 0.8374 -2.0980
25th Percent. 0.9656 -1.3031
Median 1.0710 -0.7091
75th Percent. 1.1223 -0.3795
90th Percent. 1.2220 2.1469
Max. 1.4100 26.1748
Correlation -0.2110
Table 3.5: Sample Selection
Expected Reserves
compared it to the expected reserves calculated by PDVSA for the whole coun-
try, classi(ed by oil quality. The table clearly demostrates that my sample is
not a representative sample of the total (elds in the country. Therefore, sample
bias may explain the concentration of (elds around a type of cost. This will
prevent me from proposing an optimal tax structure for the sector, since it is
important to know the composition of (elds.
In the following subsections I will use the panel to construct the parameters
needed to evaluate the tax reform. As was mentioned previously, these tax
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4.1. Assigning Areas to Tax Codes
4.1.1. Dividing Between Established Fields and Closed Fields
The reader will notice that the slope in these graphs is diﬀerent to those in Section 1.3.
The reason is that in that case, the further away we move on the horizontal axis the the
cost. That representation was chosen for expositional purposes, while this one is closer to our
estimation.
changes were sectorial reforms, therefore diﬀerent areas got diﬀerent breaks.
The panel used does not provide the information on the tax treatment of each
area. As I mentioned before this was done under the assumption of no taxes.
However, I can divide the areas using the results of my estimation together with
the description of the areas given in the reasons for the reform. Then, I can
calculate the eﬀects of the reform.
In this subsection I will divide my sample between diﬀerent tax arrangements.
The common characteristic of all these areas is that they are PclosedA under
the current tax system. Therefore, I will use the zero-pro(t condition to divide
producing (elds from closed (elds.
As explained in the previous sections, the idea here is to (nd the combinations of
and that produce zero pro(ts, given that there are (xed costs of development.
In other words, we want to (nd the combinations of and that make the next
equality hold:
(4.1)
for , and being the values that solve 3.1.
This would give us a plane on the space of and that will divide it between
pro(table and non-pro(table (elds. Figure 4.1 shows an example of this. The
vertical axis represents the diﬀerences in quality: higher , higher quality. On
the other hand the horizontal axis represents the diﬀerences in extraction costs.
The higher the , the higher extraction costs.
ZPC plots the level curve for those projects that are going to result in zero
pro(ts. In this case the relationship is positive. The higher the extraction costs,
the higher the quality should be in order to keep the project without losses.
Projects above the line will produce, while projects below it will not.
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Figure 4.1: Zero-Pro(t Condition, Level Curve
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4.1.2. Dividing Among Closed Fields
Heavy Oils Areas:
Operating Agreements:
Exploration at Risk:
It is important to remember that the information I received from PDVSA were geologically
optimal paths that did not take into account overhead costs and other (xed costs.
This low number also seems to add to the evidence that the panel represented here is a
biased panel of (elds. The reader can see that in Figure 4.2 there is almost a PholeA between
the (elds that actually produce with the taxes and the (elds that do not produce at all.
This seems to suggest that the panel represented here includes primarily PDVSA (elds (i.e.,
no or few heavy oils, operational agreements, and exploration at risk areas).
This magnitude comes from the following numbers: The expected initial exploration eﬀort
for the eight areas was expected to cost US$ 485 million and the sum of the Plump-sumA bonds
bid on the eight areas was of US$ 250 millions.
I added up these numbers and divided by eight.
In Figure 4.2 I illustrate the zero-pro(t conditions derived from my estima-
tion. There I show four diﬀerent curves: one without taxes (PZPCA), one with
royalty (PZPC RoyaltyA), one with income taxes (PZPC Inc TaxA) and one with
both taxes (PZPC Inc Tax+RoyA).
Thus we see that (fty-six (56) (elds will not produce, even without the
taxes. Once the traditional taxes in Venezuela were introduced, 9 additional
(elds would be closed.
To divide the areas among closed (elds I will use the description employed to
grant them the special tax arrangement as summarized in Table 2.2.
As shown in Table 2.2 on page 34, these areas are of low
value. Consequently, of the areas that are not produced, I will consider Heavy
Oils those whose is less than 0.9418 (i.e., areas with crudes of 20 or less degrees
API). These represent 4 of the closed areas.
Here I put all the other areas that are not produced
under the current tax system. This means that there are 5 areas.
As I mentioned earlier, these areas may be interpreted
in diﬀerent ways. I have chosen to assume that they have a higher (xed cost of
development than do the other areas. This assumption implies that their ZPC is
diﬀerent too. To determine the areas assigned to this group I did the following:
1. Calculate a new ZPC with an additional (xed cost of development of US$
92 millions , with income tax and royalty.
50
Figure 4.2: Fields and Entry Conditions
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4.2. Results
new tax
no tax
%∑∑ &
%∑∑ &
%∑∑ &%∑∑ &
As I will explain in the next subsection, this was the reform proposed for these (elds.
PDVSA Heavy Oil Expl. at Risk Op. Agr.
With no Tax
Reserves Used 0.9110 0.5253 0.8652 0.6759
Areas Producing 724 4 32 5
Under the current tax arrangement
Reserves Used 0.6937 0 0 0
Areas Producing 724 0 0 0
Under the tax changes proposed
Reserves Used 0.6840 0.3381 0.6004 0.5096
Reserves Used 0.7508 0.6463 0.6939 0.7540
Areas Producing 724 3 32 4
2. Calculate a new ZPC with the same (x cost, but without royalty.
3. Take those areas that were not produced under (1) and are produced under
(2). Total: 32 areas. It is important to recall that these areas were not
previously counted as closed ones under the current tax system. The
inclusion of these areas means that 41 areas are closed due to the current
tax system.
In this section I will present the impact of the reform on the diﬀerent areas. The
values shown in Table 2.1 on page 33, are the ones I will use in the calibration.
In Table 4.1, I show the results of the reform based on the arguments given
for it, reserves developed and areas closed. The reader will note that I show
the amount of reserves developed in each area as a fraction of the total resource
base. As I explained before, since the panel I use has a small number of areas I
found this number more representative.
Table 4.1: Evaluating the Tax Reform: Target Variables
Area
Variable
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The table (rst presents the situation as it would be with no taxes. We see
that the total number of areas that are available for production would produce
under this scenario. Next, under the current tax arrangement, we see that only
PDVSA areas produce. Then we see the improvements brought about by the
new tax changes, as a result of which 38 of the 41 areas are recovered. Also, the
amount of reserves recovered is important. The new tax arrangements recovered
between 30% and 60% of the resource base in the closed areas. Alternatively, we
can say the reform recovered between 65% and 75% of the economically feasible
reserves.
Table 4.2 focuses upon welfare variables. I show the total producer surplus
generated by each area, the total tax collected and the social surplus of the
marginal barrel. These are shown for each area under the diﬀerent scenarios.
On the (rst set of results, I show the total surplus in each area that would be
produced if there were no taxes. Obviously, under this assumption, the marginal
surplus would be zero in all (elds (Social Private ). It is clear
that we cannot compare absolute magnitudes here, because of the overwhelming
diﬀerence in the number of areas in favor of PDVSA Areas. For this reason, I
will focus my discussion on the marginal surplus.
In the next set of results, I calculate the same variables again, this time under
the current tax system. Because, under this assumption, there is no production
in areas other than PDVSA areas, these areas have no surplus. Consequently,
the surplus of the marginal barrel is the surplus of the (rst barrel produced.
Note that, even though we do have production in PDVSA areas, the surplus of
the marginal barrel in these areas is higher than in almost all other areas. This
is because the other areas have lower value, higher costs, etc. As a consequence,
the best strategy is to increase production in PDVSA areas rather than in the
other areas.
The next step is to introduce the recent reforms. Because the PDVSA areas
have not experienced a change in their tax structure, we see no change for them.
I (nd that an extra-surplus is generated in all the PnewA areas. Also more taxes
are collected since the new areas will not produce under the old tax code.
As I mentioned, the social value of the barrels produced is much higher in
PDVSA areas than in other areas. This raises the question of how should an op-
timal tax reform be constructed. Given that I do not have a good representation
of the (elds universe, I cannot answer that question. However, I can determine
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Surplus:
Tax: Net present value of all taxes collected.
Marg. Surplus: Social
PDVSA Heavy Oil Expl. at Risk Op. Agr.
With no tax
Surplus ( ) 871.64 0.42 23.00 1.12
Marg. Surplus 0 0 0 0
Under the current tax agreement
Surplus ( ) 766.68 0 0 0
Tax ( ) 628.58 0 0 0
Marg. Surplus 9.1880 3.1342 9.8058 4.5217
Under the tax changes proposed
Surplus ( ) 766.68 0.32 19.45 0.92
Tax ( ) 628.58 0.24 17.71 0.81
Marg. Surplus 9.1880 1.1308 4.2782 1.7098
Table 4.2: Evaluating the Tax Reform: Welfare Variables
Areas
Variables
what would be the eﬀects of a general reform. In other words, what the eﬀects
of the reforms on PDVSA areas would be. The results are given in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 presents the same variables I show in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Clearly,
if the reform is applied to PDVSA areas, no improvement will be made in terms
of the number of areas producing.
In terms of reserves, it is obvious that the total fraction of reserves pro-
duced in PDVSA areas Zif these areas were operating under the various new tax
systemsZ would be greater than would be the case in the non-PDVSA areas.
Nevertheless, the marginal recovery of reserves in PDVSA areas, thanks to the
tax changes, is lower than the marginal recovery in the non-PDVSA areas. It
cannot be concluded that the total gain in reserves in PDVSA areas would be
smaller. It will depend on the total composition of the (elds.
In terms of welfare, again we have gains. The interesting result here is that
the marginal surplus after the tax reforms in PDVSA areas continues to be
54




9
9
9
9
(%)
10
10
10
10
5. Conclusions
Table 4.3: Evaluating the Tax Reform: General Tax Reform
Variable Eﬀects on PDVSA areas if we
applied the reform to...
None Hvy. Oil Exp. Risk Op. Ag.
Reserves 0.6840 0.8497 0.7255 0.8862
Change - 0.1651 0.0415 .2022
Areas Producing 724 724 724 724
Change - - - -
Surplus ( ) 766.68 857.66 789.72 866.64
Change ( ) - 90.98 23.04 99.96
Marg. Surplus 9.1880 4.9280 9.0438 1.8108
Tax ( ) 628.58 418.26 706.66 646.57
Change ( ) - -210.32 78.08 17.99
bigger than the surplus in the new areas. This means that the surplus per
barrel generated by the reform in PDVSA Areas is bigger.
Finally, I have calculated the level of government revenue created under all
these scenarios. It is clear that, as a result of all the changes, the government
gains more revenue, except in the case of introducing the heavy oils tax agree-
ment in PDVSA Areas. This is another way of measuring tax distortions. The
fact that more tax revenue can be generated under the PeasingA of the tax rules
means that the sector is at a point were the marginal change in the tax rate
would be more than oﬀ-set by the marginal change in production.
This paper has shown that a comprehensive tax reform of the oil sector should
consider not simply whether projects are being developed under the current tax
system but, rather, the eﬀects of the tax structure on the whole oil sector and
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A.1. Results from Section 1.1
Appendix
A. Deduction of Mathematical Results
For a complete treatment on the solution to this kind of problem see Chiang [1].
the distortions it creates.
The recent reforms in the Venezuelan oil tax system have pointed towards
the development of marginal areas. The argument behind these reforms was
that these areas either had the highest burden or were not being developed at
all. However, it may be the case that these areas are also the ones that the tax
system distorts the least. As a consequence, there would be areas where the tax
system generates more distortions and thus a tax reform should be focused on
those areas.
Estimating a model of the Venezuelan Oil sector, I found the reforms were
bene(cial in the sense that they would reduce death-weight losses, increase re-
serves developed and also increase government revenue. On the other hand, I
estimated the eﬀects of a general reform, applying to established areas a similar
reform to that applied to marginal areas. In this case, I found that the general
reform would also produce eﬃciency gains and increase reserves developed, but
most importantly, would increase tax collection coming from established areas.
This result implies that these areas are overtaxed and a reduction of the tax
rates would increase tax revenue. Therefore, a general, more comprehensive tax
reform would be welfare improving.
We set up the Hamiltonian for 1.1, and get:
(A.1)
One of the characteristics of this problem is that the Lagrangian multipliers
are constant, implying the solution in 1.2.
This problem has a Fixed-Endpoint. Therefore, if we solve for the transver-
sality condition:
(A.2)
we get:
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Again, remember that (rms are price takers, and thus that the condition is given by the
equality of the marginal costs to the average costs. This condition is not aﬀected by the royalty.
but we know that Consequently, we can rewrite the transver-
sality condition as 1.3.
Finally, to solve for the amount of reserves developed, we know that we can
rewrite our problem as:
(A.3)
where the * implies that we have substituted the optimal path in the expression
and, again, represents the Hamiltonian. Therefore, maximizing it with respect
to , we get 1.4 . This also proves that can be interpreted as a shadow price.
From 1.7 it is clear that:
(A.4)
From the transversality condition 1.3, we get that Therefore, for
the (rst order condition in 1.6 will imply:
(A.5)
The restrictions on the problem in 1.5 will imply that:
(A.6)
Finally, for any diﬀerent from the (rst order condition in 1.6 will imply:
(A.7)
Putting together A.4, A.5, A.6 and A.7, we get an expression like:
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for
We can then get the results in 1.9 from the derivation of A.8 with respect to
the parameters we are interested in.
However, for 1.9.c and 1.9.d we need some conditions in order to ensure the
proper sign of the derivative. If I rewrite A.8 as:
(A.9)
for and . We (nd
that:
(A.10)
for and
These results are relatively intuitive. Remember that one of the consequences
of the royalty is the shift of production through time. These results indicate that,
if it is too costly to do so, relative to the cost of changing reserves ( too
high and too low), it would be better to change reserves.
However, it should be noted that the numerator of the expression inside the
integral is always greater than one, except for Therefore, this means that
should be very low in order for the expression in the square brackets to
be negative. It can safely be said that, in general, this expression is going to be
positive.
Somewhat similar to A.4, we (nd that:
(A.11)
Using the same reasoning applied in A.5, we (nd that for :
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Again, the restrictions on the problem in 1.10 will imply that:
(A.13)
Finally, for any diﬀerent from , the (rst order condition in 1.11 will imply:
(A.14)
Putting together A.11, A.12, A.13 and A.14 we (nd that:
(A.15)
for
Taking derivatives of A.15 with respect to the parameters we are interested
in, we get the results in 1.14.
In this case, the Hamiltonian would be:
(A.16)
Again, the Lagrangian multipliers are constant, implying the solution in 2.2.
If we rewrite A.3 for this problem, we get:
(A.17)
because now pro(ts are a function of . Therefore, the (rst order condition
with respect to would change to:
(A.18)
or, diﬀerently, 2.3.
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